

## A comment on the PCAST report: Skip the “match”/“non-match” stage

### Abstract

This letter comments on the report “Forensic science in criminal courts: Ensuring scientific validity of feature-comparison methods” recently released by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). The report advocates a procedure for evaluation of forensic evidence that is a two-stage procedure in which the first stage is “match”/“non-match” and the second stage is empirical assessment of sensitivity (correct acceptance) and false alarm (false acceptance) rates. Almost always, quantitative data from feature-comparison methods are continuously-valued and have within-source variability. We explain why a two-stage procedure is not appropriate for this type of data, and recommend use of statistical procedures which are appropriate.

**Keywords:** PCAST report; forensic statistics; match/non-match; sensitivity; false alarm; likelihood ratio

### Highlights

- Feature-comparison methods produce continuously-valued data.
- The PCAST report advocates a two-stage procedure:
  - (1) Dichotomise the data into “match” or “non-match”.
  - (2) If “match”, assess correct acceptance and false acceptance rates.
- A better procedure would directly statistically model the continuously-valued data.

On September 20, 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) released their report: *Forensic science in criminal courts: Ensuring scientific validity of feature-comparison methods* [1]. The report is rightly critical of “heterodox” “non-empirical” views ([1] §4.7, pp 59–63), and we wholeheartedly endorse the report’s call for forensic analysis methods to be empirically validated under casework conditions. We see the report as an important contribution to improving forensic science practice, and implementation of the report’s recommendations would constitute a major step forward. Our intention in this letter is to encourage an additional step forward.

The PCAST report advocates a procedure for evaluating strength of evidence that is a substantial improvement over historical (and in many places current) practice, but further improvement is desirable and achievable. The report describes a procedure for quantifying “probative value”<sup>1</sup> in which if a forensic practitioner declares a “match”,<sup>2</sup> they also report the results of an empirical assessment of the probability of declaring a “match” if the questioned-source specimen came from the known source<sup>3</sup> and the probability of declaring a “match” if the questioned-source specimen came from some other source.<sup>4</sup> “The forensic examiner should report the overall false positive rate and

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<sup>1</sup> what we call “strength of evidence”

<sup>2</sup> also called “proposed identification” in the report ([1] p 46)

<sup>3</sup> this would be the numerator for a likelihood ratio

<sup>4</sup> this would be the denominator for a likelihood ratio

sensitivity for the method established in the [empirical] studies of foundational validity and should demonstrate that the samples used in the foundational studies are relevant to the facts of the case.” ([1] p 56). This is not an inappropriate procedure for quantifying strength of evidence if the data are discrete and have no within-source variability.

If, however, the data are continuously-valued and have within-source variability,<sup>5</sup> then such a procedure discards information that could be exploited by more appropriate statistical procedures. Almost always, measurements made in “feature-comparison methods” will naturally result in continuously-valued data with within-source variability. For this type of data it is generally inappropriate to use a procedure which includes a stage that assesses “whether the features in an evidentiary sample and the features in a sample from a suspected source lie within a pre-specified measurement tolerance” ([1] p 48). Such a procedure suffers from a cliff-edge effect: A questioned-source specimen which falls just above the threshold for “match” with the known-source sample and a questioned-source specimen which falls just below the threshold will result in very different conclusions as to the strength of the evidence, even though the difference between the two is negligible (the two specimens could in fact be from the same source, with the difference between them due to within-source variability). Also, a procedure that includes a “match”/“non-match” stage limits the strength-of-evidence conclusion to one of two possible values: A questioned-source specimen which vastly exceeds the threshold will be assessed as having exactly the same strength of evidence as a questioned-source specimen which just exceeds the threshold, even if the former should in theory constitute much stronger evidence than the latter. *Mutatis mutandis* for a specimen which falls just short of the threshold and one which falls far below the threshold.

A more appropriate procedure would not include a “match”/“non-match” stage, would not use a threshold, and would instead directly assess two probabilities<sup>6</sup> based on the continuously-valued data: (1) The probability of obtaining the measured properties of the questioned-source specimen had it come from the known source; versus (2) the probability of obtaining the measured properties of the questioned-source specimen had it come not from the known source but from some other source in the relevant population. The former is the numerator and the latter is the denominator of a likelihood ratio.<sup>7</sup> There is a substantial body of literature describing and validating statistical procedures which work directly with continuously-valued data. Such statistical procedures would *a priori* be expected to have higher degrees of validity than those that include a “match”/“non-match” stage, and for particular applications actual performance can be compared via empirical tests (e.g., [2], [3]).

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<sup>5</sup> Within-source variability could be intrinsic or due to transfer or measurement processes.

<sup>6</sup> technically “likelihoods”

<sup>7</sup> There are multiple appropriate statistical procedures for calculating forensically interpretable likelihood ratios for continuously-valued data. The choice of the best procedure to use will depend on the details of the particular question to be answered in the case, the structure of the data to be analysed, and empirical testing of performance. To accurately represent many of these procedures would require more complex descriptions than the verbal description of a likelihood ratio just given in the main text. For simplicity, we only include the latter description in the present letter.

The PCAST report does not exhibit familiarity with the extensive existing literature on forensic inference and statistics, very little is referenced. The history of forensic science includes multiple examples in which procedures including a “match”/“non-match” stage were advocated and used, but which were subsequently replaced by procedures that more directly exploit continuously-valued measurements. Aitken & Taroni ([4] pp 10–11) and Foreman et al. ([5] pp 474–476) discuss examples from glass and DNA respectively. Additional publications critical of two-stage procedures in which the first stage is “match”/“non-match” include [6]–[16]. Progress toward “ensuring scientific validity of feature-comparison methods” will be quicker if forensic practitioners skip the “match”/“non-match” procedure advocated in the PCAST report and move directly to using validated statistical procedures which are appropriate for continuously-valued data.

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