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	Particle	
	Given Name	<b>Kevin</b>
	Suffix	
	Division	Fire Research Division
	Organization	National Institute of Standards and Technology
	Address	Gaithersburg, USA
	Email	kevin.mcgrattan@nist.gov
Author	Family Name	<b>Peacock</b>
	Particle	
	Given Name	<b>Richard</b>
	Suffix	
	Division	Fire Research Division
	Organization	National Institute of Standards and Technology
	Address	Gaithersburg, USA
	Email	
Author	Family Name	<b>Overholt</b>
	Particle	
	Given Name	<b>Kristopher</b>
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Keywords (separated by '-')	Fire modeling - Model validation - Nuclear power plants	





# Validation of Fire Models Applied to Nuclear Power Plant Safety

Kevin McGrattan\*, Richard Peacock and Kristopher Overholt, Fire Research Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA

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**Abstract.** The paper highlights key components of a fire model validation study conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Electric Power Research Institute. These include the selection of fire phenomena of interest to nuclear power plant safety, the selection of appropriate models, the selection of relevant experimental data, and the selection of appropriate evaluation criteria. For each model and each quantity of interest, there are two metrics of accuracy. The first is a bias factor, which indicates the extent to which the model tends to over or under-predict the given quantity. The second is a relative standard deviation, which indicates the degree of scatter in the predicted quantity when compared with experimental measurements. While the study is motivated by nuclear power plant safety, the general procedure and results are appropriate for most industrial applications.

**Keywords:** Fire modeling, Model validation, Nuclear power plants

## 1. Introduction

Both domestically and worldwide, risk-informed and performance-based analyses are being introduced into fire protection engineering practice. One key tool needed to support performance-based design in fire protection is the availability of verified and validated fire models that can reliably predict the consequences of fires. Code requirements from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the International Code Council (ICC) acknowledge the need to understand the limitations of computer models applied to building design. NFPA 5000 [1] requires that the methods used to judge performance be shown to be valid and appropriate for the proposed use, including the impact of uncertainty on design calculations. NFPA 805 [2] includes provisions for models to be verified and validated for application to nuclear power plants. As part of a larger effort to support risk-informed design for nuclear power plants, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in cooperation with the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) have published the results of an extensive validation effort for a range of fire calculation tools that may be used in power plant design [3]. This NRC/EPRI study, originally published in 2007 and updated in 2014, includes an evaluation of a selection of available fire models ranging from spreadsheet-based empirical

\* Correspondence should be addressed to: Kevin McGrattan, E-mail: kevin.mcgrattan@nist.gov

42 correlations to a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model. This paper includes  
 43 a sampling of results of the empirical correlations, the Consolidated Fire and  
 44 Smoke Transport zone fire model (CFAST), and the Fire Dynamics Simulator  
 45 (FDS) CFD model. Included is a review of the experiments used in the compari-  
 46 sons with the models, an analysis of the uncertainty of the experiments, and a  
 47 selection of quantitative comparisons of the model predictions with a range of  
 48 experimental results that demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the models.

49 Given the complexity and range of features in current fire models, it is impracti-  
 50 cal to evaluate the accuracy of every model output. Thus, the study focuses on fire  
 51 phenomena and hazards that are directly relevant for a range of compartment fire  
 52 scenarios, such as the movement of smoke and hot gases from compartment to  
 53 compartment, the integrity of electrical cables and fire barriers, and the effective-  
 54 ness of smoke removal systems. Overall, 14 predicted quantities were chosen,  
 55 including the depth and average temperature of the hot gas layer (HGL), ceiling  
 56 jet and plume temperatures, radiant and total heat flux onto walls and “targets,”  
 57 and concentrations of combustion gas species and smoke.

## 58 2. Models and Predicted Quantities

59 The Office of Research of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed a  
 60 set of spreadsheets to calculate commonly used empirical correlations of fire phe-  
 61 nomena [4]. Table 1 lists the most widely used of the correlations.

62 CFAST [14] is a two-zone fire model that predicts the environment that arises  
 63 within compartments as a result of a fire prescribed by the user. CFAST was  
 64 developed and is maintained primarily by the Fire Research Division of NIST.  
 65 CFAST calculates the average temperatures of the upper and lower gas layers  
 66 within each compartment; layer interface position within each compartment; flame  
 67 height; ceiling, wall, and floor temperatures within each compartment; flow

**Table 1**  
**List of Empirical Correlations Evaluated in the Study**

Output quantity	Correlation
HGL temperature, natural ventilation	McCaffrey, Quintiere, Harkleroad (MQH) [5]
HGL temperature, forced ventilation	Foote, Pagni Alvares (FPA) [5] Deal and Beyler (DB) [5]
HGL temperature, no ventilation	Beyler [5]
Plume temperature	Heskestad [6] McCaffrey [7]
Ceiling jet temperature	Alpert [8]
Radiation heat flux	Point source method [9] Solid flame method [9]
Electrical cable failure time	Thermally-Induced Elec. Failure (THIEF) [10]
Steel temperature	Thermally-thin assumption [11]
Sprinkler activation time	DETECT [12]
Detector activation time	Temperature rise assumption [13]

68 through vents and openings; visible smoke and gas species concentrations within  
69 each layer; target temperatures; heat transfer to targets; sprinkler activation time;  
70 and the impact of sprinklers on the heat release rate (HRR) of the fire. CFAST  
71 version 6.3.1 was used in the study.

72 FDS [15] is a CFD model of fire-driven fluid flow. The model numerically  
73 solves a form of the Navier–Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, ther-  
74 mally-driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires. The  
75 partial derivatives of the equations for conservation of mass, momentum, and  
76 energy are approximated as finite differences, and the solution is updated in time  
77 on a three-dimensional, rectilinear grid. Thermal radiation is computed using a  
78 finite volume technique on the same grid as the flow solver. Lagrangian particles  
79 are used to simulate smoke movement and sprinkler discharge. FDS computes the  
80 temperature, density, pressure, velocity, and chemical composition within each  
81 numerical grid cell at each discrete time step. There are typically hundreds of  
82 thousands to several million-grid cells, and thousands to hundreds of thousands of  
83 time steps. In addition, FDS computes the temperature, heat flux, mass loss rate,  
84 and various other quantities at solid surfaces. FDS version 6.0.0 was used in the  
85 study.

86 ASTM E1355 [16] provides guidance for evaluation of deterministic fire models  
87 for specific applications of interest. Following ASTM E1355, the organization(s)  
88 performing the validation study select the types of experiments and the measured  
89 quantities against which to compare the model predictions. In the case of the  
90 NRC/EPRI study, the following predicted quantities were judged to be of most  
91 relevance to nuclear power plant (NPP) safety:

92 **Hot gas layer (HGL) temperature:** The HGL temperature is particularly impor-  
93 tant for NPP fire scenarios because it is an indicator of overhead target damage  
94 (e.g., cable trays) away from the ignition source.

95 **Hot gas layer depth:** The depth of the HGL is important because it indicates  
96 whether a given target is immersed in high temperature gases.

97 **Ceiling jet temperature:** The ceiling jet is the shallow layer of hot gases that  
98 spreads radially below the ceiling as the fire plume impinges on it. The tempera-  
99 ture of this layer is distinctly higher than the temperature associated with the  
100 HGL. The ceiling jet temperature is important in NPP fire scenarios where targets  
101 may be located just below the ceiling and for determining activation of heat detec-  
102 tion devices.

103 **Plume temperature:** The fire plume is the buoyant flow of hot gases rising from  
104 the base of the fire. The fire plume transports hot gases into the HGL. Its temper-  
105 ature is greater than the ceiling jet and HGL temperature. It is particularly impor-  
106 tant in NPP fires because of the numerous postulated scenarios that involve  
107 targets directly above a potential fire.

108 **Heat flux to targets:** In NPP fire model analyses, damage to targets is assumed  
109 when either the surface temperature or heat flux exceeds specified limits. A target  
110 can be any object whose functionality of is importance to plant safety.

111 **Surface (walls, floors, and ceilings) heat flux:** Surface heat flux refers to the  
112 incident or net heat fluxes received by room surfaces such as walls, floors, or ceil-  
113 ings. This category of heat flux is considered separately from target heat flux to

114 determine if the models have any particular strengths or weaknesses in their handling of walls, floors, and ceilings as opposed to objects within the compartment such as electrical cables.

115  
116  
117 **Target temperature:** Target temperature refers to the surface temperature of specific items within the computational domain. The calculation of the temperature of targets, e.g., electrical cables, is perhaps the most common objective of fire modeling analyses.

118  
119  
120  
121 **Cable failure time:** Electrical cable failure time is often compared with the time to start detection and suppression activities. It specifically refers to the time it takes a fire to increase the surface or internal temperature of a cable to its damage or ignition temperature.

122  
123  
124  
125 **Surface (wall, floor and ceiling) temperature:** As with heat flux, surface temperature of walls is distinguished from that of targets to determine if the models have particular strengths or weaknesses.

126  
127  
128 **Smoke concentration:** The smoke concentration can be an important quantity in NPP fire scenarios that involve rooms where operators may need to perform actions during a fire or where smoke detectors are installed.

129  
130  
131 **Oxygen concentration:** Oxygen concentration is an indicator of a fire becoming under-ventilated, which can be a pre-cursor to flashover.

132  
133 **Sprinkler activation time:** Activation time of sprinklers or heat detectors is an important fire modeling output as it is often compared with the cable or target damage time. It specifically refers to the time it takes a fire to increase the temperature of the fusible link in a sprinkler or heat detection device.

134  
135  
136  
137 **Smoke detector activation time:** Smoke detector activation time often serves as the trigger for suppression activities either by automatic systems or a fire brigade. It specifically refers to the time it takes a fire to generate the smoke concentration conditions sufficient to activate the smoke detection device.

138  
139  
140  
141 **Room pressure:** Room pressure is a rarely used quantity in NPP fire modeling. It can be important if it affects smoke migration to adjacent compartments or the operation of mechanical ventilation.

### 144 **3. Experiments and Experimental Uncertainty**

145 This section includes a summary of the experiments used in the validation study, presents a review of the experimental uncertainty associated with these experiments for the measured quantities of interest, and discusses the range of the experimental data in terms of common parameters used in fire protection engineering.

#### 150 **3.1. Description of Experiments**

151 Following is a list of experiments selected by the NRC and EPRI for the validation study. The criteria for selection included (1) the data are publicly available, 152 (2) the experiments are well-documented, and (3) the fire scenarios are similar to 153 what would be expected in an NPP. 154

155 **ATF Corridor Experiments:** A series of 18 experiments (six sets of three repli-  
156 cates) were conducted in a two-story structure with long hallways and a connect-  
57 ing stairway at the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Fire  
58 Research Laboratory in Ammdendale, Maryland, in 2008 [17]. The fuel source was  
59 a 0.4 m square natural gas burner.

60 **Cable Response to Live Fire – CAROLFIRE:** An experimental and modeling  
61 study sponsored by the NRC to study the thermal response and functional behav-  
62 ior of electrical cables [10]. The primary objective of CAROLFIRE was to charac-  
63 terize the various modes of electrical failure (e.g., hot shorts, shorts to ground)  
64 within bundles of power, control and instrument cables exposed to radiant heating  
65 and open fire sources. A secondary objective of the project was to develop a sim-  
66 ple model to predict thermally-induced electrical failure (THIEF). The measure-  
67 ments used for these purposes were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories  
68 and are described in Vol. 2 of the CAROLFIRE test report. The modeling was  
69 conducted by NIST and documented in Vol. 3.

70 **Fleury Heat Flux Measurements:** Rob Fleury, a student at the University of  
71 Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand, measured the heat flux from one, two,  
72 or three adjacent 0.3 m square propane burners [18].

73 **FM/SNL Experiments:** The Factory Mutual and Sandia National Laboratories  
74 experiments consisted of 25 fire tests conducted in 1985 for the NRC by Factory  
75 Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC), under the direction of Sandia National  
76 Laboratories (SNL) [19, 20]. The primary purpose of these experiments was to  
77 provide data with which to validate computer models for various types of NPP  
78 compartments. The fires ranged from 0.9 m diameter propene burners to compa-  
79 rably sized pans of heptane.

80 **iBMB Experiments:** Several validation experiments were conducted at the Insti-  
81 tut für Baustoffe, Massivbau und Brandschutz (iBMB) of the Braunschweig Uni-  
82 versity of Technology in Germany as part of an international fire model  
83 validation program [3]. The tests were intended to study large pool fires in rela-  
84 tively small compartments. The fires were fueled by jet fuel and ethanol in pans  
85 ranging in diameter from 0.5 m to 1.0 m.

86 **LLNL Enclosure Experiments:** Sixty-four experiments were conducted by Law-  
87 rence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in 1986 to study the effects of ven-  
88 tilation on enclosure fires [21]. The fires were fueled by a 0.6 m diameter natural  
89 gas burner.

90 **NBS Multi-Compartment Experiments:** The National Bureau of Standards  
91 (NBS, which is now called the National Institute of Standards and Technology,  
92 NIST) Multi-Compartment Test Series consisted of 45 fire tests representing 9 dif-  
93 ferent sets of conditions were conducted in a three-room suite in 1985 [22]. The  
94 suite consisted of two relatively small rooms, connected via a relatively long corri-  
95 dor. The fire source, a 0.3 m square natural gas burner, was located against the  
96 rear wall of one of the small compartments.

97 **NIST/NRC Compartment Experiments:** A series of 15 large-scale experiments  
98 sponsored by NRC and performed at NIST in 2003 [23]. The fire sizes ranged  
99 from 350 kW to 2.3 MW in a compartment designed to resemble a switchgear



200 room in an NPP. The fire was fueled with either heptane or toluene sprayed into  
201 a 0.5 m by 1.0 m rectangular pan.

202 **NIST Smoke Alarm Experiments:** A series of experiments was conducted by  
203 NIST to measure the activation time of ionization and photoelectric smoke alarms  
204 in a residential setting [24]. Tests were conducted in actual homes with representa-  
205 tive sizes and floor plans, utilized actual furnishings and household items for fire  
206 sources, and tested actual smoke alarms commercially available at that time.

207 **SP Adiabatic Surface Temperature Experiments:** In 2008, three compartment  
208 experiments were performed at SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden under  
209 the sponsorship of Brandforsk, the Swedish Fire Research Board [25]. The fires  
210 were fueled by a 0.3 m square natural gas burner. The objective of the experi-  
211 ments was to demonstrate how plate thermometer measurements in the vicinity of  
212 a simple steel beam can be used to supply the boundary conditions for a multi-  
213 dimensional heat conduction calculation for the beam.

214 **Steckler Compartment Experiments:** Steckler, Quintiere and Rinkinen performed  
215 a set of 55 compartment fire tests at NBS in 1979 [26]. The compartment was  
216 2.8 m by 2.8 m by 2.13 m high, with a single door of various widths, or alterna-  
217 tively a single window with various heights. The fires were fueled by a 0.3 m  
218 diameter natural gas burner. The tests were conducted to study entrainment and  
219 vent flow induced by a compartment fire.

220 **UL/NIST Vent Experiments:** In 2012, the Fire Fighting Technology Group at  
221 NIST conducted experiments at Underwriters Laboratories (UL) in Northbrook,  
222 Illinois, to assess the change in compartment temperature due to the opening of  
223 one or two 1.2 m square ceiling vents [27]. The fires were fueled by a 0.8 m square  
224 natural gas burner.

225 **UL/NFPRF Sprinkler, Vent, and Draft Curtain Experiments:** In 1997, a series of  
226 34 heptane spray burner experiments was conducted at the Large Scale Fire Test  
227 Facility at Underwriters Laboratories (UL) in Northbrook, Illinois [28, 29]. The  
228 experiments were divided into two test series. Series I consisted of twenty-two  
229 4.4 MW fire experiments. Series II consisted of twelve 10 MW fire experiments.  
230 The objective of the experiments was to characterize the temperature and flow  
231 field for fire scenarios with a controlled heat release rate in the presence of sprin-  
232 klers, draft curtains, and smoke and heat vents.

233 **U.S. Navy High Bay Hangar Experiments:** The U.S. Navy (USN) sponsored a  
234 series of 33 experiments within two hangars examining fire detection and sprinkler  
235 activation in response to spill fires in large enclosures. Experiments were con-  
236 ducted using JP-5 and JP-8 fuels in two Navy high bay aircraft hangars located in  
237 Naval Air Stations in Barbers Point, Hawaii and Keflavik, Iceland [30]. Eleven  
238 experiments were conducted in Hawaii, twenty-two in Iceland.

239 **Vettori Ceiling Sprinkler Experiments:** Robert Vettori analyzed a series of 45  
240 experiments conducted at NIST that were intended to compare the effects of dif-  
241 ferent ceiling configurations on the activation times of quick response residential  
242 pendent sprinklers. The test parameters consisted of two ceiling configurations,  
243 three fire growth rates, and three burner locations a total of 18 unique test con-  
244 figurations with sets of two or three replicates each [31]. The 0.7 m by 1.0 m burner

was fueled by natural gas. Vettori analyzed a similar set of sprinkler experiments involving ceilings of various slopes [32].

**VTT Large Experiments:** The VTT large hall tests consisted of eight heptane pan fire experiments conducted in 1998 and 1999 [33]. The experiments represented three sets of conditions, and were undertaken to study the movement of smoke in a large hall with a sloped ceiling. The results of the experiments were contributed to the International Collaborative Fire Model Project (ICFMP) for use in evaluating model predictions of fires in large volumes representative of turbine halls in NPPs.

**WTC Spray Burner Experiments:** As part of its investigation of the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster, the Building and Fire Research Laboratory at NIST conducted several series of fire experiments to both gain insight into the observed fire behavior and also to validate FDS for use in reconstructing the fires. The first series of experiments involved a relatively simple compartment with a liquid spray heptane/toluene burner and various structural elements with varying amounts of sprayed fire-resistive materials [34].

### 3.2. Experimental Uncertainty

With a few exceptions, the test reports for the experiments described above contain little information about the experimental uncertainty. However, the report by Hamins et al. of the NIST/NRC Experiments [23] contains a fairly extensive discussion of the uncertainties of measurement devices that were used in the experiments chosen for the study. Using this information, estimates of experimental uncertainty were made for all the experiments as a whole. Details can be found in Ref. [3].

Table 2 summarizes the estimated uncertainties of the measurements of the quantities of interest. The *Measurement Uncertainty* refers to the measurement device itself, such as a thermocouple, heat flux gauge, etc. The *Propagated Input Uncertainty* refers to the uncertainty in the quantity of interest that is associated with the uncertainty of key measured input parameters, such as the heat release rate or ventilation rate. For example, the propagated input uncertainty of the predicted gas and solid temperatures, 0.05, is largely due to the uncertainty in the heat release rate, which has been estimated to be approximately 0.075. Various hot gas layer and plume correlations (like MQH) predict that the temperature rise is proportional to the heat release rate raised to the two-thirds power. Therefore, the propagated uncertainty in the temperature predictions is expected to be two-thirds of the uncertainty in the heat release rate.

The *Combined Uncertainty* represents the total experimental uncertainty, denoted as  $\bar{\sigma}_E$ , is obtained by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the measurement and parameter propagation uncertainties.

### 3.3. Summary of Experimental Parameters

Table 3 presents a summary of the experiments in terms of parameters commonly used in fire protection engineering. This “parameter space” outlines the range of applicability of the models included in the validation study. In other words, if this validation study is to be cited as justification for using a given model to simulate

**Table 2**  
**Summary of Uncertainty Estimates**

Output quantity	Measurement Uncertainty	Propagated Input Uncertainty	Combined Uncertainty, $\tilde{\sigma}_E$
Gas and solid temperatures	0.05	0.05	0.07
HGL depth	0.05	0.00	0.05
Gas concentrations	0.02	0.08	0.08
Smoke concentration	0.14	0.13	0.19
Pressure, closed compartment	0.01	0.21	0.21
Pressure, open compartment	0.01	0.15	0.15
Velocity	0.07	0.03	0.08
Heat flux	0.05	0.10	0.11
No. activated sprinklers	0.00	0.15	0.15
Sprinkler activation time	0.00	0.06	0.06
Cable failure time	0.00	0.12	0.12
Smoke alarm activation time	0.00	0.34	0.34

All values are expressed in the form of a standard relative uncertainty

288 a given fire scenario, that scenario must be similar to these experiments in the  
289 sense of having comparable physical parameters. These parameters are explained  
290 below:

291 **Fire Froude Number,  $\dot{Q}^*$** , is a useful non-dimensional quantity for plume corre-  
292 lations and flame height estimates:

$$\dot{Q}^* = \frac{\dot{Q}}{\rho_{\infty} c_p T_{\infty} \sqrt{g D D^2}} \quad (1)$$

**Table 3**  
**Summary of Important Experimental Parameters**

Test series	$\dot{Q}^*$	$L_f/H$	$\phi$	$W/H$	$L/H$	$r_{ej}/H$	$r_{rad}/D$
ATF	0.3–3.3	0.3–0.9	0.0–0.1	0.8	7.1	0.8–6.0	N/A
Fleury	0.3–5.5	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	1.7–3.3
FM/SNL	0.6–2.4	0.3–0.6	0.0–0.2	2.0	3.0	0.2–0.3	N/A
LLNL	0.2–1.5	0.1–0.4	0.1–0.4	0.9	1.3	0.3–1.0	N/A
NBS	1.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	5.1	N/A	N/A
NIST/NRC	0.3–2.0	0.3–1.0	0.0–0.3	1.9	5.7	0.3–2.1	2.0–4.0
NIST Alarms	0.2–0.3	0.2–0.5	N/A	1.7	8.3	1.3–8.3	N/A
SP AST	6.1	1.1	0.1	1.0	1.5	N/A	N/A
Steckler	0.8–3.8	0.3–0.7	0.0–0.6	1.3	1.3	N/A	N/A
UL/NFPRF	4.0–9.1	0.7–1.0	Open	4.9	4.9	0.6–3.9	N/A
UL/NIST	0.7–2.6	0.8–1.6	0.2–0.6	1.8	2.5	1.0–2.3	N/A
USN Hawaii	0.7–1.3	0.1–0.4	Open	4.9	6.5	0–1.2	N/A
USN Iceland	0.7–1.3	0.0–0.3	Open	2.1	3.4	0–1.0	N/A
Vettori	2.5	1.1	0.3	2.1	3.5	0.8–2.9	N/A
VTT	0.7	0.2	0	1.0	1.4	0–0.6	N/A
WTC	0.6–0.9	0.8–1.1	0.3–0.5	0.9	1.8	0.0–0.8	0.3–1.3

where  $\dot{Q}$  is the peak heat release rate of the fire,  $\rho_\infty$  is the ambient density,  $c_p$  is the specific heat of the air,  $T_\infty$  is the ambient temperature,  $g$  is the acceleration of gravity, and  $D$  is the equivalent diameter of the base of the fire, calculated as  $D = \sqrt{4A/\pi}$ , where  $A$  is the area of the base.  $\dot{Q}^*$  is essentially the ratio of the fuel gas exit velocity and the buoyancy-induced plume velocity. Jet fires are characterized by large Froude numbers. Typical accidental fires have a Froude number near unity.

**Flame Height Relative to Ceiling Height**,  $L_f/H$ , is a convenient way to express the physical size of the fire relative to the height of the room,  $H$ . The height of the visible flame, based on Heskestad's correlation, is estimated by:

$$L_f = D \left( 3.7 (\dot{Q}^*)^{2/5} - 1.02 \right) \quad (2)$$

**Global Equivalence Ratio**,  $\phi$ , is the ratio of the mass flux of fuel,  $\dot{m}_f$ , to the mass flux of oxygen,  $\dot{m}_{O_2}$ , into the compartment divided by the stoichiometric ratio,  $r$ .

$$\phi = \frac{\dot{m}_f}{r \dot{m}_{O_2}} \equiv \frac{\dot{Q} \text{ (kW)}}{13,100 \text{ (kJ/kg)} \dot{m}_{O_2}} \quad (3)$$

The supply rate of oxygen to the compartment depends on whether it is naturally or mechanically ventilated:

$$\dot{m}_{O_2} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} 0.23 A_0 \sqrt{H_0} & : \text{ Natural Ventilation} \\ 0.23 \rho_\infty \dot{V} & : \text{ Mechanical Ventilation} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Here,  $A_0$  is the area of the compartment opening,  $H_0$  is the height of the opening, and  $\dot{V}$  is the volume flow of air into the compartment. If  $\phi < 1$ , the compartment is considered "well-ventilated" and if  $\phi > 1$ , the compartment is considered "under-ventilated."

**Compartment Aspect Ratios**,  $W/H$  and  $L/H$ , where  $W$  and  $L$  represent the width and length, indicate if the compartment is shaped like a hallway, typical room, or vertical shaft.

**Relative Distance along the Ceiling**,  $r_{cj}/H$ , indicates the distance away from the fire plume centerline of a sprinkler, smoke detector, etc., relative to the compartment height,  $H$ . The subscript "cj" denotes ceiling jet.

**Relative Distance from the Fire**,  $r_{rad}/D$ , indicates whether a "target" is near or far from the fire. This ratio is of importance in a radiation calculation.

## 4. Model Uncertainty

The experiments described in the previous section involved thousands of individual point measurements of gas and surface temperatures, heat fluxes, gas concentrations, and so on. These measurements are typically made continuously during the experiment, and the models make predictions of these same quantities at the same sampling frequency. This leads to hundreds of thousands of point to point

329 comparisons of model predictions and experimental measurements. These results  
 330 must be reduced to a more tractable form. Peacock et al. [35] discuss various ways  
 331 of comparing two time histories of a given quantity. A commonly used metric is  
 332 simply to compare the measured and predicted peak values. If the data are spiky,  
 333 some form of time-averaging can be used. Regardless of the exact form of the  
 334 metric, what results from this exercise is a pair of numbers for each time history,  
 335  $(E_i, M_i)$ , where  $i$  ranges from 1 to  $n$  and both  $M_i$  and  $E_i$  are positive numbers  
 336 expressing the increase in the value of a quantity above its ambient. For a given  
 337 quantity of interest, there might be hundreds of these pairs. These data need to be  
 338 reduced even further so that one can evaluate the model uncertainty in predicting  
 339 the given quantity. The basic idea is to express the accuracy of the models in pre-  
 340 dicting a given quantity of interest using a pair of statistics. The first is a bias fac-  
 341 tor,  $\delta$ , which expresses the tendency of the model to over or under-predict the  
 342 measured quantity. For example, a bias factor of 1.10 indicates that the model, on  
 343 average, over-predicts the measured quantity by 10 %. The second statistic is a  
 344 relative standard uncertainty that indicates the degree of scatter about the mean.  
 345 How these values are used in practice will be described below. Details of the sta-  
 346 tistical analysis are described in detail in Ref. [36] and summarized here.

347 To estimate the mean and standard deviation of the distribution, first define:

$$\overline{\ln(M/E)} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ln(M_i/E_i) \quad (5)$$

349 Note that the logarithm is used because the standard deviation of the logarithm of  
 350 a normally distributed random variable is approximately equal to the standard  
 351 deviation divided by the mean, the relative standard deviation.

352 The least squares estimate of the standard deviation of the combined distribu-  
 353 tion is defined as:

$$\tilde{\sigma}_M^2 + \tilde{\sigma}_E^2 = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ \ln(M_i/E_i) - \overline{\ln(M/E)} \right]^2 \quad (6)$$

355 Recall that  $\tilde{\sigma}_E$  is known and the expression on the right can be evaluated using  
 356 the pairs of measured and predicted values. Equation (6) imposes a constraint on  
 357 the value of the experimental uncertainty,  $\tilde{\sigma}_E$ . A further constraint is that  $\tilde{\sigma}_M$   
 358 cannot be less than  $\tilde{\sigma}_E$  because it is not possible to demonstrate that the model is  
 359 more accurate than the measurements against which it is compared. Combining  
 360 the two constraints leads to:

$$\tilde{\sigma}_E^2 < \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}(\ln(M/E)) \quad (7)$$

362 An estimate of  $\delta$  can be found using the mean of the distribution:

$$\delta = \exp\left(\overline{\ln(M/E)} + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}_M^2}{2} - \frac{\tilde{\sigma}_E^2}{2}\right) \quad (8)$$


For a given model prediction,  $M$ , of the quantity of interest whose bias factor,  $\delta$ , and relative standard deviation,  $\tilde{\sigma}_M$ , have been calculated from all of the available validation data, the true (but unknown) value of this quantity,  $\theta$ , is assumed to be normally distributed:

$$\theta \sim N\left(\frac{M}{\delta}, \tilde{\sigma}_M^2 \left(\frac{M}{\delta}\right)^2\right) \quad (9)$$

The mean and variance of this normal distribution are based solely on comparisons of model predictions with past experiments that are similar to the particular fire scenario being analyzed. The performance of the model is quantified by the estimators of the parameters,  $\delta$  and  $\tilde{\sigma}_M$ , which have been corrected to account for uncertainties associated with the experimental measurements.

As an example of how to make use of Eq. (9), suppose a fire model is being used to estimate the likelihood that electrical control cables could be damaged due to a fire in a compartment. Damage is assumed to occur when the surface temperature of any cable reaches  $200^\circ\text{C}$ . What is the likelihood that the cables would be damaged if the model predicts that the maximum surface temperature of the cables is  $175^\circ\text{C}$ ? First, consider for this example that the model bias factor,  $\delta$ , is 1.13 and the relative standard deviation,  $\tilde{\sigma}_M$ , is 0.20. Now, Consider the distribution, Eq. (9), of the “true” temperature,  $\theta$ , shown graphically in Figure 1. The vertical lines indicate the critical temperature at which damage is assumed to occur ( $T_c = 200^\circ\text{C}$ ), and the temperature predicted by the model ( $175^\circ\text{C}$ ). Given an ambient temperature of  $20^\circ\text{C}$ , the predicted temperature rise,  $M$ , is  $155^\circ\text{C}$ . The mean and standard deviation in Eq. (9) are calculated:

$$\mu = 20 + \frac{M}{\delta} = 20 + \frac{155}{1.13} = 157^\circ\text{C} \quad (10)$$



**Figure 1. Plot showing a possible way of expressing the uncertainty of the model prediction.**

$$\sigma = \tilde{\sigma}_M \frac{M}{\delta} = 0.20 \times \frac{155}{1.13} = 27^\circ\text{C} \quad (11)$$

respectively. The shaded area beneath the bell curve is the probability that the “true” temperature can exceed the critical value,  $T_c = 200^\circ\text{C}$ , which can be expressed via the *complimentary error function*:

$$P(T > T_c) = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erfc} \left( \frac{T_c - \mu}{\sigma \sqrt{2}} \right) = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erfc} \left( \frac{200 - 157}{27 \sqrt{2}} \right) \approx 0.06 \quad (12)$$

This means that there is a 6 % chance that the cables could become damaged, assuming that the model’s input parameters are not subject to uncertainty.

## 5. Sample Results

This section presents a sample of results from the NRC/EPRI validation study [3]. The results of the full study are summarized in Table 4.

### 5.1. HGL Temperature

The empirical correlations and zone models predict an average HGL temperature, while CFD models predict the local gas temperature in each computational grid

**Table 4**  
**Model Uncertainty Metrics for All Quantities of Interest**

Output quantity	Empirical correlations			CFAST		FDS	
	Name	$\delta$	$\tilde{\sigma}_M$	$\delta$	$\tilde{\sigma}_M$	$\delta$	$\tilde{\sigma}_M$
HGL temperature, natural	MQH	1.17	0.15	1.20	0.36	1.02	0.12
HGL temperature, forced	FPA	1.29	0.32				
	DB	1.18	0.25	1.15	0.19	1.21	0.22
HGL temperature, closed	Beyler	1.04	0.37	1.00	0.08	1.20	0.12
HGL depth	–	–	–	1.05	0.34	1.03	0.06
Ceiling jet temperature	Alpert	0.86	0.11	1.16	0.39	0.98	0.14
Plume temperature	Heskestad	0.84	0.33				
	McCaffrey	0.90	0.31	1.07	0.20	1.20	0.21
Oxygen concentration	–	–	–	1.00	0.15	1.01	0.11
Smoke concentration	–	–	–	3.69	0.68	2.63	0.59
Pressure rise	–	–	–	1.77	0.63	0.96	0.27
Target temperature	Steel	1.29	0.45	1.58	0.64	0.98	0.18
Target heat flux	Point source	1.44	0.47				
	Solid flame	1.17	0.44	0.97	1.16	0.98	0.25
Surface temperature	–	–	–	1.05	0.28	0.99	0.12
Surface heat flux	–	–	–	0.99	0.35	0.92	0.15
Cable failure time	THIEF	0.90	0.11	–	–	1.10	0.16
Sprinkler activation time	RTI	1.11	0.41	0.79	0.21	0.93	0.15
Detector activation time	Temp. rise	0.66	0.57	1.12	0.46	0.85	0.29



403 cell. For the purpose of comparing all of the models with experimental measure-  
404 ments, both the CFD predictions and experimental measurements of local gas  
405 temperatures can be spatially averaged to form a representative average HGL  
406 temperature. Because there are different empirical correlations governing compart-  
407 ments that are naturally ventilated, mechanically ventilated, or unventilated, the  
408 results for HGL temperature are divided into three categories; natural, forced and  
409 no ventilation. The natural ventilation results are discussed here. Natural ventila-  
410 tion refers to compartments with no mechanical ventilation system operational  
411 during the test and passive openings to the outside.

412 The results for the MQH correlation, CFAST, and FDS are shown in Figure 2.  
413 Note that the MQH correlation is only intended for a single compartment and  
414 vertical vents, and, thus, only includes a subset of the available experimental data.  
415 For the empirical correlations, the validation results do not include the UL/NIST  
416 Vents experiments (due to the presence of ceiling vents), the ATF Corridors  
417 experiments (due to the multi-story compartment configuration), or the VTT  
418 experiments (due to vents that were located high in the compartment, complex  
419 wall lining materials, and irregular geometry).


420 CFAST, the zone model, has simulated all of the experiments, and the increased  
421 scatter in its predictions compared to the empirical correlations are due to inclu-  
422 sion of additional experiments that the MQH correlation cannot address. The  
423 UL/NIST Vents experiments are noticeably over-predicted. These tests include  
424 large vents in the ceiling of the compartment that may extend beyond the original  
425 vent sizes of the empirical correlation used to determine flow through ceiling  
426 vents. In addition, the combination of larger HGL temperature and smaller HGL  
427 depth compared to the experimental data suggest that part of the difference may  
428 be attributed to the reduction method used to estimate layer temperature and  
429 position from the individual temperature measurements in the experiments.

430 There is no obvious bias in the FDS predictions, and no particular trends in the  
431 data. The relatively low bias and model relative standard deviation suggest that  
432 FDS HGL predictions are close to experimental uncertainty. FDS does not calcu-  
433 late an HGL temperature directly. Rather, it predicts the gas temperatures at the  
434 same locations as the experimental measurements, and the HGL temperature is  
435 calculated in the exact same way as it is for the experimental data.


## 436 **5.2. Plume Temperature**

437 There exist a variety of empirical correlations that predict the plume temperature,  
438 and these correlations are also embedded within the zone models. CFD models  
439 compute the plume temperature directly from the fundamental equations of  
440 motion. The results for the McCaffrey correlation, CFAST and FDS are shown in  
441 Figure 3. In this case, CFAST, the zone model, is the most accurate for two rea-  
442 sons. First, CFAST uses the McCaffrey correlation to calculate plume tempera-  
443 ture and entrainment, but it includes the effect of the HGL. Second, FDS does  
444 not employ an empirical correlation and calculates the plume temperature directly  
445 from the governing equations. This is a possible explanation of the fact that  
446 CFAST has less of a bias in predicting plume temperature than FDS.





**Figure 2. Summary of measured and predicted HGL temperatures under natural ventilation conditions.**




**Figure 3. Summary of measured and predicted plume temperatures.**

447 **5.3. Target Temperature**

448 The results for predicted target temperature are shown in Figure 4. The targets  
 449 include unprotected and protected steel members and electrical cables. For the

Author Proof



**Figure 4. Summary of measured and predicted target temperatures.**

450 empirical correlations, the exposing temperatures were provided by either the  
451 MQH HGL temperature correlation or the McCaffrey plume correlation, depend-  
452 ing on the location of the target relative to the fire. The uncertainty in these pre-  
453 dictions is often based on the selection of the exposing conditions, rather than the  
454 calculation of the target response. As with the correlations, the averaging of the  
455 HGL temperature in a zone model accounts for much of the uncertainty in its  
456 prediction of target response. Similar to the HGL temperature comparisons, the  
457 increased scatter in the CFAST predictions compared to the empirical correlations  
458 are likely due to inclusion of additional experiments that the correlations cannot  
459 address. In addition, for CFAST, the effects on target heating from the fire plume  
460 are only directly included if the target is located directly over the fire centerline.  
461 For targets near but off-center, only the impact of the average hot gas layer tem-  
462 perature is included. The FDS results show no obvious bias or trend.

#### 463 *5.4. Summary of All Quantities of Interest*

464 Table 4 summarizes the results of the validation study. For each model and each  
465 quantity of interest, the model bias factor and relative standard deviation are listed.  
466 Note that the empirical correlations could not be applied to all of the quantities.

## 467 **6. How to Use the Results of the Validation Study**

468 The following steps outline the main components of a fire modeling analysis for  
469 nuclear power plant applications. With the exception of specific references to  
470 nuclear-specific guidance documents, this basic procedure can be applied to most  
471 any fire modeling study.

- 472 1. Postulate a fire scenario. NFPA 805 [2] provides guidance in selecting fire sce-  
473 narios in NPP applications.
- 474 2. Choose an appropriate model. The summary scatter plots such as those shown  
475 above can help determine the level of accuracy expected of the various types of  
476 models.
- 477 3. For the given fire scenarios that are postulated as part of the overall analysis,  
478 the modeler must check that the parameters described in Sect. 3.3, applied to  
479 the postulated scenarios, are appropriate given the parameter space defined by  
480 the listed experiments. In other words, are the postulated fire scenarios within  
481 the range of validation of the chosen model?
- 482 4. All of the model results should be presented with an appropriate statement of  
483 model uncertainty. For NPP applications, the example in Sect. 4 is typical  
484 because most fire model calculations are performed to determine the likelihood  
485 that a given temperature or heat flux threshold is exceeded. This question can  
486 be answered directly in a way that incorporates the model uncertainty, e.g.,  
487 there is a 6 % chance that the temperature of the cable will exceed 200°C.

488 These last two steps address common complaints by some in the fire community  
489 that models are used inappropriately and that models results cannot be trusted.

The remedy for this problem is to design the fire modeling process specifically to address these concerns. It is not sufficient for the modeler to simply claim that the chosen model is appropriate; he/she must prove it by citing relevant validation studies, demonstrating that the given application is within the model's range of validity, and quantifying the effect of model uncertainty on the model predictions. Model uncertainty analysis is no longer an option—it is an integral part of the process.

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